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Case and Comment
D RINK W ATK R AND A N O TH ER  v. KIMBKR
Husband and wifc-Action by husband and wife for injury to wife-IIus- 
band’s contributory ncgligcnce-Liabilitv to contribute towards damages 
awarded to wife-Law Reform (Contributory Negligence)
Act, 1945 (c. 28), s. 1 (1)
The Courts, have always shown great reluctance to consider an 
Act of Parliament as altering or modifying a previous enactment, unless 
it does so in clear words. This is another decision which speaks 
eloquently in favour of this principle.
The fact situation which gave rise to this action involves no in­
tricacy. Mrs. O. was driving with her husband when their vehicle 
collided with a car driven bv Mr. K. Mr. and Mrs. D. brought 
this action for injuries suffered bv Mrs. 1). as a result of the collision: 
liability for the wife’s injury was admitted, but the husband plaintiff 
was found pu tlv  to blame. The defendant’s counterclaim raised the 
issue whether under section 1 (1) of the Contributory Negligence Act 
(19-f5) the husband would be liable towards his wife for Ins propor­
tionate contribution to the injury.
At the vcrv outset of his ease, counsel for the defendant was met 
w ith strong opposing legislation: the English Tortfeasors Act (sec. 6 ss. 1 * 
recites that “W here damage is suffered by any person as a result of 
a tort (c) anv tortfeasor liable in respect of that damage may recover 
contribution from any other tortfeasor who is, or would if sued have 
been liable in respect of the same damage.” As husbands and wives 
may not sue each other in tort, this Act is ostensibly of no avail to the 
defendant but may prove fatal to his case.
Despite the clear words of the Tortfeasors Act, counsel for the 
defendant argued strenuously that see. 1 (1) of the Contributory 
Negligence Act had the effect of defeating the tortious immunity which 
existed between husband and wife. T he pertinent section relied 
upon, provides: “W here any person suffers damage as the result partly 
of his own fault and partly of the fault of any otlier person or persons 
a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated bv reason of 
the fault of the person suffering the damage.” As this section makes 
no mention of the husband and wife limitation, the defendant con­
tended that the husband plaintiff came within the words “any other 
person.” Hence the husband should be made to compensate the 
defendant for damages arising out of the injury to the w'ife since lie 
was partly responsible for it.
Devlin J.. rejecting counsel’s contentions first directed liis attention 
to the general scope of the Contributory Negligence Act. Having 
remarked that the “Act is not intended to alter am substantive defence 
to a cause of action,” he continues: “T he defendant’s construction 
of subs ( 1 ) depends on reading the word “damage ’ as meaning more 
than physical damage and as wide enough to include the sort of fin­
ancial loss which arises when, as the result of a wrongful act, a man 
has to make a payment to the third p,arty. It might perhaps, be read 
that wax if tlicrc were nothing to point to the contrary....but 
that reading makes subs. 3 at best superflous and at worst contradictory. 
If contribution between joint tortfeasors is among other cases covered by 
subs. (1 ), it is superflous, and, indeed almost incomprehensible, to pro­
vide that s. 6 shall apply to persons who would be liable bv virtue of 
sub. s. ( 1 ). If however the meaning of “damage” is restricted to physical 
damage, the two sub-sections fall into place and arc complimentary.”
If 1 were to add to that sound expose of statute exegesis it would 
be to agree with the conclusion of Devlin J. bv resorting to different 
means. Indeed I should prefer to tread a shorter path to reach a sim­
ilar result.
W ithout elaborating extensively on the history of the relevant 
statutes involved in this ease, it is possible to restrict their application, 
thus leaving their content intact and the word “damage” to be defined 
bv a higher authority.
As I propose to discard the Contributory Ncgligcncc Act as irre­
levant to the issue on the counterclaim, I shall deal with it now. This 
Act was ev olved to meet situations where the cause of damages due to 
negligence was divisible and attributable to different agents. It appor­
tions damages in terms of causation; but its application is restricted to 
definite relationships. T o claim under the Act, independently of 
some other enactment, the parties must have been at the same time 
agents and victims of the negligent act complained of: both must have 
given and rcccivcd. If one of those essentials is lacking, the relationship 
is not established and the Act will not apply unless some other statute 
grants the privilege.
Let me illustrate what I wish to convey bv referring to the case 
at hand. Here the plaintiff husband and the defendant were found 
negligent and both partly to blame for the collision. As between 
themselves, the Act clearly applies; but will it be applicable to all the 
damages which have issued from the impact?
Glancing back on the facts, wc arc met with the wife’s claim for 
her injuries. The Court has found no ncgligcncc, cither personal 
or imputed on her part. W ere it not for the rule that wife and husband 
mav not sue each other in tort, she would have a perfectly good claim 
against cither perpetrator of the negligent act. But even then, 
site is not preclude:! from collecting her entire damages. The law on
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this subjcct is thus expressed in The American Restatement Of Torts, 
\ o .  S83: ‘ W here two persons would otherwise be liable for a harm, 
one of them is relieved from liability by the fact that the other has an 
absolute privilege to act or an immunity from liability to the person 
harmed.” At tliis stage, the defendant admits liability for the wife’s 
claim but counterclaims against the husband for the hitter’s proportion­
ate contribution to the wife’s injuries. As he was responsible for part 
of the wife’s injuries onlv, he contends that he should be compensated 
by the husband plaintiff for the other portion of the damages. The 
fallacy of defendant’s argument mav easily be detected; lie relies pri­
marily and exclusively- on the Contributory Negligence Act, while he 
should first direct his attention to the Tortfeasors Act. Considered 
in relation to Mrs. D., both drivers were tortfeasors; they were co­
tortfeasors. Therefore, the liability issuing from that relationship 
should be governed primarily bv the Tortfeasors Act. This Act pro­
vides for compensation between co-tortfcasors; but one may recover 
from the other only if the partv injured could have sued that co-tort­
feasor from whom recovery is sought. If the injured party in this case 
could have sued D. then the Act would apply and the amount of damage 
recoverable by K. would be defined by the Contributory Negligence 
Act. But as the facts in the counterclaim preclude us from enquiring 
beyond the Tortfeasors Act, it is submitted that am discussion of the 
Contributory Negligence Act was superfluous ancf irrelevant to the 
counter-issue.
Donat J. Levesque, 2nd year.
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